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Energy costs represent around 60–70% of operating costs of a ship and with the fuel price soaring to
record levels, energy efﬁciency has become the top priority for many shipping companies. Numerous
cost-effective energy efﬁcient options (technologies for new and existing ships and operations) have
been identiﬁed for improving the energy efﬁciency of ships. Analysis from industry leading experts and
recognised bodies has so far shown substantial unrealised abatement potential using options that often
appear to be cost-negative at current fuel prices. Apart from the shortcomings of the analysis, failure to
realise this potential could be attributable to various market barriers and failures. This paper discusses
non-market failures and market failures in context of shipping and draws on ﬁndings of a survey of
shipping companies to assess their pervasiveness. The results are compared with analysis undertaken
with the global shipping system model (GloTraM). Initial results from these methods suggest the exis-
tence of some non-market failures and market failures that have also been discussed in other sectors and
industries.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
It is suggested that reducing global greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions by ﬁfty to eighty percent below 1990 levels by 2050 is necessary
to stabilise the climate and avoid dangerous climate change impacts
(IPCC, 2007). To avoid dangerous climate change, all the sectors of the
global economy will be required to lower their GHG emissions. The
global transport sector emissions represent around thirteen percent of
global CO2 emissions, of which total shipping CO2 emissions (from
international and domestic shipping) accounted for just under three
percent (1 Gt) of global CO2 emissions in 2012 (Smith et al., 2014).‘Low
carbon shipping' describes a transition from the shipping industry's
current levels of emissions and emissions intensity, to lower levels.
There is still only limited understanding of exactly what the extent of
the transition would need to be and how it could be achieved, but to
mitigate risks of dangerous climate change and to align with dec-
arbonisation in other sectors of the economy, a reduction in absolute
emissions relative to today's by 30–80% is not inconceivable as a
longer term aim (Anderson and Bows, 2011). In light of that level of
ambition, this paper aims to consider what barriers might prevent the
implementation of such levels of decarbonisation in the shipping
industry.
The carbon emissions of transport can be expressed as the
product of transport demand (using capacity tonne miles t.nm i.e.r Ltd. This is an open access article
tulla).tonne nautical miles) and transport supply represented by emis-
sions intensity (gCO2/t nm i.e. grams of CO2 emitted per tonne
nautical mile). On the transport supply side there are four options
available to reduce emissions from shipping (Buhaug et al., 2009)
namely, improving energy efﬁciency i.e. increasing productivity
using same amount of energy, using renewable energy sources e.g.
solar and wind, using fuels with lower carbon content e.g. liquid
natural gas and biofuels and using emission reduction technolo-
gies e.g. through chemical conversion, capture and storage. For the
purposes of this paper, we will assume that transport demand is
out of scope as a ‘lever’ to reduce emissions. The paper therefore
focuses on the transport supply side and improving energy efﬁ-
ciency as a strategy towards low carbon shipping.
1.1. Assessing the decarbonisation potential of a ship
A key component of the shipping system is the individual ships. A
number of options exist for either increasing energy efﬁciency or the
abatement of CO2 from ships. These can be either operational mea-
sures, such as speed reduction and weather routing, or technical
measures, such as waste heat recovery and air lubrication (Wang et al.,
2010), which can be applied to new build ships and in some cases also
for retroﬁt to existing ships. A common method of presenting analysis
of the order in which these options might be adopted and the like-
lihood of investment, particularly for policy work, is the Marginal
Abatement Cost Curve (MACC). A MACC is a graph that indicates the
marginal cost of emission abatement for varying amounts of emissionunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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in Faber et al. (2009), Buhaug et al. (2009), Wang et al. (2010), DNV
(2009). Besides the inherent shortcomings in MACC analysis (Kesicki,
2010), for shipping it is commonly undertaken with an incomplete
representation of costs and little representation of risk (beyond the
investment rate of return). The result from the above referenced
analyses has so far been the identiﬁcation of substantial, up to 30%
unrealised abatement potential using options that often appear to be
cost-negative at current fuel prices.
1.2. Deﬁning barriers and the energy efﬁciency gap
From the MACCs referenced earlier, it can be observed that there
are some options that have a negative cost when implemented. This
means they are proﬁtable options since they show a positive net
present value, which would mean that the option will save money
through reduced fuel expenditure over the investment horizon
assumed in the modelling. This could be because the majority of these
measures are operational measures, which require less capital outlay
compared to technical measures generally featured on the right hand
side of the curve. Furthermore, since these options are operational
measures, they could in theory also be implemented by charterers
with long term time charters. The MACCs however do not show
current implementation rates of these options, hence there is a need
to gauge the actual implementation rates of these within the industry
and sectors. Thereafter, there is a need to understand why some of
these measures were implemented and why some had been not taken
up, despite their apparent negative cost i.e. identifying the energy
efﬁciency gap (Fig. 1). To assess the actual implementation a survey of
shipping companies was conducted and compared with modelled
implementation, details of which will be discussed in Section 3.
The term ‘energy efﬁciency gap’ refers to the difference
between the actual lower levels of implementation of energy
efﬁciency measures and the higher level that would appear to be
cost-beneﬁcial or effective from the consumers or ﬁrms point of
view based on techno-economic analysis (Brown, 2001; Golove
and Eto, 1996). Some of the energy efﬁciency gap can be explained
by rational behaviour to market barriers that may not be captured
by the techno-economic analysis. If these can be accurately mod-
elled, then the remaining energy efﬁciency gap can be explained
by market failures, as shown in Fig. 1, see also Blumstein et al.
(1980), Jaffe and Stavins (1994), Sanstad and Howarth (1994).
A barrier may be deﬁned as a postulated mechanism that
inhibits investment in technologies that are both energy efﬁcient
and economically efﬁcient (Sorrell et al., 2004). It has been argued
that the energy efﬁciency gap exists due to barriers to energy
efﬁciency (Sorrell et al., 2000; Thollander et al., 2010). These bar-
riers have been broadly categorised as economic, behavioural and
organisational (Sorrell et al., 2004) and in practice this taxonomy
is not exclusive, each barrier will have economic, behavioural and
organisational aspects (Weber, 1997). The focus of this paper is
mainly on economic barriers to energy efﬁciency. Economic bar-
riers to energy efﬁciency stem from neo-classical economics,
which assume individuals and organisations as rational and utility
or proﬁt maximising. Thus, economic barriers to energy efﬁciency
can be categorised as market failures and non-market failures.
Market failures are ﬂaws in the way the market operates in theRational behaviour – Non- market failures e.g. cost of capital
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Fig. 1. Explaining the energy efﬁciency gap.context of energy efﬁciency e.g. lack of information, whereas non-
market failures are rational responses of actors to an investment in
the context of energy efﬁciency e.g. capital constraints.2. Categorizing barriers to energy efﬁciency in shipping
As highlighted earlier there exist many opportunities to
improve the energy efﬁciency of new and existing ships through
technical and operational measures, some of which at negative
costs at current fuel prices. Possible explanations for why these
options are not taken up or implemented are that models for
analysis are inadequate for representing costs and beneﬁts of low
carbon and energy efﬁciency investment. The data used may be
incorrect or other implementation barriers or failures exist which
are obstructing the implementation of the measures, such as
informational problems, split incentives, access to and cost of
capital. This section brieﬂy examines these in the context of
shipping, beginning with analysis of each of the non-market fail-
ures followed by the market failures.
Non-market failures are obstacles that contribute to the slow
diffusion and adoption of energy efﬁcient measures (Brown, 2001)
and where the organisation is behaving rationally given their
existence (Sorrell et al., 2004). They include heterogeneity, risk,
hidden costs and access to capital, which are discussed in turn
below in relation to literature in shipping.
2.1. Heterogeneity
Although a technology may be cost-effective on average for a class
of users taken in aggregate, the class (e.g. panamax container ships,
speciﬁc routes and commodities), itself, consists of a distribution of
owners and operators: some could economically purchase additional
efﬁciency, while others will ﬁnd the new level of efﬁciency not cost-
effective (Sweeney, 1993). This will result in overstating the oppor-
tunities for a particular option in a particular sector. Wang et al. (2010)
in their MACC analysis report that the cost effectiveness and CO2
emission reduction potential for each option varies widely as a func-
tion of ship type, size and age, for example, the potential for emission
reduction through speed reductions for containerships is much
greater compared to tankers and bulkers, which are relatively slower
moving vessels.
2.2. Risk
Technologies are assumed incorrectly to be mature in the techno-
economic analysis or a risk is perceived by the ﬁrm that performance
may be lower than expected, thus risk premiums and depreciation are
not adequately included in the model. Early investors may be sceptical
about the prospects of a technology and demand a premium on return
in order to cover the risks of the investment (Faber et al., 2009). For
example, when commissioning newbuilds if depreciation is faster
than expected, due to the adoption of technology i.e. diffusion and
lower costs due to the learning curve, the solvency of the company
may be threatened. So in some cases a shipowner commissioning a
new ship would have to compare the risk of having a ship with an
innovative design that may depreciate faster than expected with the
risk of having a ship with a conventional design but higher opera-
tional costs. In such an assessment, the most fuel efﬁcient ship may
not always come out best (Faber et al., 2009). According to Sorrell et al.
(2000) risk has three dimensions in the context of energy efﬁciency:
 External risk – includes overall economic trends, fuel price,
policy and regulation. This is highly representative of what is
being faced by shipping companies, especially the latter two.
Fuel costs are paramount in the industry and its expectation can
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note how the industry copes with its uncertainty. Rehmatulla
(2014) shows that on average in the drybulk sector over 50% of
the charter market is on time charter where fuel costs are paid
for by the charterer, whereas Faber et al. (2009) and Wilson
(2010) suggest that almost 70–90% of the fuel costs are passed
on. There is also uncertainty in future regulations in shipping
which may not be factored in during design but could poten-
tially be implemented in the ships.
 Business risk – includes ﬁnancing risk and sectoral trends. A
major focus for the shipowner is the ﬁnancing costs of a ship
and its repayment (Stopford, 2009). For some shipping markets
there are risks that are intertemporal choices, such as develop-
ment of regional emission control area (ECA's) and use of liquid
natural gas (LNG).
 Technical risk – includes technical performance and unrelia-
bility of the measure and applies to both newbuild and retroﬁt
technologies for ships.
All of the above dimensions of risks faced by a business can
therefore lead to stringent investment criteria, such as high levels
of internal rate of return and short payback periods. Anecdotally it
has been observed that the payback periods in shipping tend to be
very short e.g. 12–18 months (HSH Nordbank, 2014, Lloyds List,
2011) despite the average age of a ship being around twenty
ﬁve years.
2.3. Hidden costs
Hidden costs are hidden to the analyst (performing the techno-
economic modelling) but not the investing ﬁrm, resulting in
overestimation of the efﬁciency potential and for shipping perhaps
the most cited argument for the efﬁciency gap (Koomey and
Sanstad, 1994; Sorrell et al., 2000). The following costs may not
have been included:
Life cycle costs – these are hidden costs relating to the energy
efﬁcient option's life cycle cost, which include
 Identiﬁcation or search costs – these relate to the direct costs
incurred as a result of searching for the relevant energy efﬁ-
ciency measure, e.g. through purchased literature, membership
access.
 Project appraisal costs – relate to the costs incurred to evaluate
a selected measure or technology to the ﬁrm's speciﬁcs e.g.
outsourcing to ﬁrms that specialise in data analysis to match the
energy efﬁciency measure with operational proﬁles of the
ﬁrm's ﬂeet.
 Commissioning costs – relates to the costs incurred when a
measure is selected, meeting with the technology vendor,
contracts.
 Additional/speciﬁc engineering costs – relates to the costs when
the measure is reaching the end of its life, these include
increased maintenance costs, decommissioning or removal of
the energy efﬁciency measure.
Transactional costs – transaction costs and other unobserved cost
items may render apparently cost-effective measures costly. Smaller
ship owners and operators may experience high transaction costs as
they cannot spread the costs of for example gathering information
over a large number of ships (Faber et al., 2009; Jafarzadeh and Utne,
2014).
Commissioning or disruption costs – some measures to reduce
emissions require retroﬁts that can only be installed by tempora-
rily suspending operations. These measures are costly to imple-
ment except at times when operations are halted for other rea-
sons, such as major survey or periodical drydocking. There maytherefore be a lag between the time when a measure becomes
available and its actual implementation (Faber et al., 2011). Ret-
roﬁts to existing ships such as the installation of wind power and
waste heat recovery systems can only be done cost-effectively
when a ship undergoes a major overhaul during a drydock, which
causes a time-lag of several years in the implementation of cost-
effective measures.
Loss of beneﬁts – reduction in beneﬁts associated with energy
efﬁcient option (Nichols, 1994). such as problems with safety, extra
maintenance, reliability and service quality. Example of this in
shipping are speed reduction and safety, exhaust gas scrubber's
reliability and extra maintenance (Acciaro et al., 2013).
2.4. Access and costs of capital
Restricted access to capital markets is often considered to be an
important barrier to investing in energy efﬁciency. Investments
may not be proﬁtable because companies also face a high price for
capital. As a result, only investments yielding an expected return
that exceeds this (high) hurdle rate will be realised (Schleich and
Grubber, 2008). Capital rationing is often used within ﬁrms as an
allocation means for investments (Bhattacharyya, 2011), leading to
hurdle rates that are much higher than the cost of capital, espe-
cially for small projects (Ross, 1986). This leads to competition
between projects within a company and may lead to low priority
given to energy efﬁciency (Bhattacharyya, 2011). If improving
energy efﬁciency comes at the cost of forgoing other more cost-
effective opportunities (because of capital or labour constraints or
because the projects are mutually exclusive alternatives), it would
be rational for the ﬁrm to give energy efﬁciency a low priority
(Faber et al., 2009). As an example, a shipowner-operator currently
has to decide between investing in a scrubber technology given
the regulations around SOx emissions or improve the energy efﬁ-
ciency of ships given the increasing fuel price.
If the above rational responses can be incorporated and accu-
rately represented in models and still show existence of apparent
cost-effective options that were not being employed, it could then
be concluded that additional implementation barriers existed. One
could then say that there is a gap between the potential reduction
achievable and current state, which could be explained by market
failures. A market failure occurs when the requirements for efﬁ-
cient or optimal allocation of resources through well-functioning
markets are violated, which leads to incomplete markets, imper-
fect competition, imperfect and asymmetric information. The lat-
ter two are more important and relevant in the context of
explaining the energy efﬁciency gap (Sorrell et al., 2000).
2.5. Information problems
Informational problems taking different forms are the principal
source of market failures that account for the energy efﬁciency gap
(Huntington et al., 1994). According to Golove and Eto (1996) this falls
into three categories; lack of information, cost of obtaining informa-
tion and accuracy of information, which are relevant to the barriers
faced by shipping companies. Generally the MACC modelling in
shipping utilises manufacturer data on costs and savings that may be
biased or optimistic, for example Wang et al. (2010) use data derived
from an engine manufacturer's brochure. Faber et al. (2011) showed
that respondents cited lack of trusted data on measures from an
independent third party as an important barrier to implementation.
Several initiatives have begun to bring more information, create
transparency and decrease the information asymmetry between
charterers and shipowners, suppliers and buyers. Accurate and reli-
able information of energy efﬁciency measures may be difﬁcult to
obtain as those who have information have strategic reasons to
manipulate it in order to inﬂate its value. Sellers advertise and
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“Self-interest is an incentive for the provision of misinformation by
sellers and the costs of acquiring additional information may be high
enough to inhibit acquisition of sufﬁcient unbiased information to
overcome well-distributed misinformation” (Golove and Eto, 1996, p.
20). It has been argued that even when information on energy efﬁ-
ciency is signalled through for example labelling, consumers may still
be wary because of past experience with advertised misinformation
(Stern and Aronson, 1984). The Energy Efﬁciency Design Index and
other indicators of fuel efﬁciency thus may not increase the trans-
parency in the market and owners of efﬁcient ships may not be able
to command higher charter rates (Faber et al., 2009). Staying on the
subject of energy efﬁciency of ships, it should be noted that the ships
themselves also lack necessary equipment onboard to provide accu-
rate fuel consumption to both the shipowner and charterer (Jafarza-
deh and Utne, 2014). Informational problems do not necessarily arise
due to agent opportunism, it may well be that one party may have
relevant information on the costs and beneﬁts of an energy efﬁciency
investment, but may ﬁnd this difﬁcult to convey to the other party
(Jaffe and Stavins, 1994, p. 805). In this case if there were no infor-
mational problems, the parties would be able to enter into contracts to
share the costs and beneﬁts of the investment. However, sometimes
this may be outweighed by the transaction costs involved hence
investment is likely to be forgone despite potential advantages to both
parties (Sorrell et al., 2004). A solution to this would be to standardise
energy savings contracts.2.6. Split incentives
Split incentives refer to the potential difﬁculties that arise
when two parties engaged in a contract have different goals and
different levels of information (IEA, 2007). Split incentives occur
when the costs and beneﬁts of energy efﬁciency accrue to different
agents (Blumstein et al., 1980; Fisher and Rothkopf, 1989; Howarth
and Winslow, 1994). In shipping, split incentives are likely to occur
due to the different types of charter (and the divided responsibility
for fuel costs) existing between shipowners and charterers. Ship
owners who invest in fuel efﬁciency improving measures cannot,
in general, recoup their investment, unless they operate their own
ships or have long term agreements with charterers, because
neither charter rates nor second hand prices of ships reﬂect the
economic beneﬁt of its fuel efﬁciency (Faber et al., 2009). Agno-
lucci et al. (2014) investigate whether energy efﬁciency is reﬂected
in time charter rates for the drybulk panamax ships (2008–2012)
and ﬁnd that on average only 40% of the fuel savings are recouped
by the shipowner-operators through higher time charter rates. The
time charter markets not representing fuel efﬁciency could be due
to the variability of actual fuel use and it may be risky for the
shipowner to guarantee a low fuel use. In speciﬁc market condi-
tions, in the time charter contracts speed may be understated and
fuel consumption per day may be overstated (Veenstra and Dalen,
2011). Hence, the fuel efﬁciency may not be well reﬂected in the
time charter market (Wang et al., 2010) and as a result owners not
obtaining premiums for energy efﬁciency. For a more detailed
discussion of split incentives in shipping refer to Rehmatulla
(2014) and Rehmatulla and Smith (2015).
Apart from the economic market failures and non-market failures,
Sorrell et al. (2000) suggest other barrier categories such as beha-
vioural and organisational, which could also be plausible explanations
of the unrealised potential in shipping. Behavioural barriers stem from
the behavioural science ﬁeld and explain the energy efﬁciency gap, as
discussed below.2.7. Bounded rationality
Orthodox economics assumes that the decision maker will
make rational decisions given the available information. Simon
(1959) argues that bounded rationality may result in satisfying
behaviour using rules of thumb. So, instead of being based on
perfect information, decisions are made by rule of thumb (Stern
and Aronson, 1984). This is connected to the inability to assess life
cycle costs of energy purchasing decisions, the same investment
appraisals may be utilised throughout all the different types of
investment opportunities including energy efﬁciency and may also
be due to information overlaod (Jafarzadeh and Utne, 2014).
2.8. Inertia
Means that “individuals and organisations are, in part, crea-
tures of habit and established routines, which may make it difﬁcult
to create changes to such behaviours and habits” (Thollander et al.,
2010, p. 55). People generally do not welcome change in their
environments and avoid or ignore problems (Stern and Aronson,
1984). An example of this in shipping is that ship yards may be
reluctant to accept ship designs other than the standard ones
(Faber et al., 2011; Jafarzadeh and Utne, 2014).
2.9. Values
Implementation of energy efﬁciency measures is inﬂuenced by
norms and values in a group or society at large. “Values such as
helping others, concern for the environment and a moral com-
mitment to use energy more efﬁciently are inﬂuencing individuals
and groups of individuals to adopt energy efﬁciency measures”
(Thollander et al., 2010, p. 55).
2.10. Credibility and trust
This is not only related to the information itself but also the
provider of information. As with informational problems, it is also
the ability of the provider of information to portray and show
these qualities, since the adoption is dependant on the receiver's
perceived credibility of and trust in the information provider. The
trustworthiness of the information provider is of signiﬁcant
importance. Thollander et al. (2010) cite an example of house-
holders’ implementation of measures when information is pro-
vided by state versus the same information being supplied by a
utility company. The shipping industry is also subject to this issue
of trustworthiness of information regarding savings potentials of
energy efﬁciency measures as discussed above.
2.11. Problem statement
Market barriers and failures, particularly the concept of an
efﬁciency gap, appear to be a common feature of a number of
markets which could be considered to be similar to shipping.
There are indications that the speciﬁc structure of the shipping
markets could be susceptible to market barriers, but to date there
has been little work to quantify the consequence of any failures
and to test rigorously for their existence.
Therefore, to develop the knowledge of shipping's low carbon
implementation barriers beyond the existing literature, this paper
will ﬁrst examine how different investment parameters might
affect the uptake of energy efﬁciency technology, and then use the
results of a survey of shipping stakeholders to investigate the
levels of uptake of low carbon initiatives. The results will also be
used to discuss differences in uptake between sectors of the
shipping markets and to hypothesise about what this might tell us
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failures.3. Method
3.1. Modelling barriers and implementation
Several different types of bottom–up models, such as optimisation
and simulation models have been used to estimate energy demand
and emissions for various sector level emissions (e.g. MARKAL,
PRIMES). Modelling realistic take up of technology through various
assumptions is an important feature of these models. Worrell et al.
(2004) identify that most bottom–up models rely on three factors that
affect technology adoption; availability, ﬁnancial costs and operational
decision making. Fleiteret al. (2011) ﬁnd that generally very simplistic
assumptions through an aggregated approach are used e.g. adjusted
higher discount rates to simulate stronger barriers. Very few models
such as PRIMES explicitly integrate barriers into the model, but even
these fall short of the large range of barriers identiﬁed empirically in
the literature (Fleiter et al., 2011) as shown in Table 1.
Source: Adapted from Fleiter et al. (2011)
The model used to analyse the extent to which different market
barriers and failures might obstruct energy efﬁciency in the
shipping global ﬂeet is GloTraM, a bottom–up model for estimat-
ing the CO2 emissions trajectories of the shipping industry. The
model applies time-domain simulation to calculate evolution over
time of the global ﬂeet. The two main drivers of the CO2 emissions
trajectories are:
 The transport demand (e.g. t nm) over time.
 The transport carbon intensity (e.g. gCO2/t nm) over time.
A more complete description of the method can be found in
Smith et al. (2013) and the derivation of the model's baseline
input data can be found in Smith et al. (2013). Greater detail on
technology modelling can be found in Calleya et al. (2012). The
techno-economic evaluation includes a number of assumptions
that represent the extent of some of the barriers discussed
above. Therefore the model can be used to explore theTable 1
Overview of bottom–up models incorporating barriers.
Models Not explicitly
considered
Simple aggregated
approach
Explicitly considered by
Imperfect
information
Hid
cos
Accounting:
-Mure ii X
-MED-PRO X
-MEAD X
-LEAP X (X)
Optimisation:
-DNE21þ X
-MARKAL X
-AIM X
-PRIMES X
Simulation
-CEF-NEMS X
-ENUSIM X
-SAVE X X
-POLES X
-ISindustry X
-LIEF X
-CIMS X X
-GloTraMconsequence of some of the classical barriers to the technical
speciﬁcation of ships and the emissions from the sector. Those
barriers include:
 Access to capital, as represented by the return on investment
period and the WACC (weighted average cost of capital).
 Time window to recoup savings, or return period for
investment.
 The principle-agent problem, represented by the proportion of
cost-saving associated with fuel-saving, that is passed from the
charterer to the owner.
3.2. Investment appraisal method
It is not possible to explain all the detail in this paper so only
detail on the evaluation of the economic beneﬁt of an intervention
is described here. For the example analysed here, it is assumed
that there are two stakeholders, one (A) who bears the capital and
operating costs of the ship and another (B) who bears the voyage
(fuel) costs. This could be considered to be typical of a time charter
arrangement but may also be present in the stakeholder chain
behind a voyage charter. If everything else remains constant, the
consequence of an investment in energy efﬁciency technology is
an increase in A's costs (higher capital and maintenance costs),
and a decrease in B's costs (lower fuel costs). The extent to which
this cost-saving is passed from B to A is a representation of the
extent of a market barrier associated with this principle-agent
problem and a key determinant of the investment strategy that A
should apply in order to maximise their proﬁts. The cost pass
through is quantiﬁed in a factor in GloTraM that takes a value
between 0 and 1. If the latter, the entire cost-saving is passed from
B to A, if 0.5 then 50% of the saving is passed from B to A and 50%
retained as B's proﬁt and if 0, 100% is retained as B's proﬁt.
3.3. Scenario speciﬁcations
For the purpose of investigating the sensitivity of low carbon
shipping to a variety of market barriers, ﬁve runs of the model
were performed for the period 2010–2025. The evolution of some
of the key inﬂuences on shipping over the period out to 2025type of barrier
den
ts
Access to
capital
Risk and
uncertainty
Split
incentives
Bounded
rationality
X
X
X X X
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exploring the impact of a range of foreseeable inputs to the
models, which in turn can demonstrate the sensitivity of outputs
to these assumptions.
The following scenario details were held constant for all runs:
 Energy Efﬁciency Design Index (EEDI) regulation – this regula-
tion entered into force in 2013 and so is assumed as a certainty.
 Compliance with SOx, NOx regulations as per IMO MARPOL
Annex VI regulations for global limits, no application of ECA
regulation – similar to EEDI, this is regulation that has been
adopted and therefore can be assumed to enter into force
according to its prescribed timetable and stringency level.
 No market based measures (MBM) or carbon price are modelled
– whilst MBM's were discussed at IMO MEPC during several
meetings, the progression of an MBM development was put on
hold in 2011 until further notice. The assumption made is that
any development of a MBM at IMO will require substantial
further work and is therefore unlikely to be entering into force
during the time period considered in this work.
 International Energy Outlook (IEO) reference oil price is used to
derive fuel prices – a number of oil price forecasts are available,
of which IEO's work is one source. The purpose of this scenario
exploration is not to understand the range of possible fuel pri-
ces (which would require a more thorough investigation of
different sources of price scenarios), but to set a reference price
and consider variations to investment parameters, hence the
selection of IEO's data.
 Long-run averages for time charter prices, held constant in time
– charter prices are known to ﬂuctuate, but for simplicity
purposes and similar to the focus of this work on only a single
fuel price scenario, the scenario exploration is all done with
only a single scenario for charter prices and a long-run average
ensures that a central price value is used.
 Main engine and fuel choice limited to conventional diesel
engines, heavy fuel oil and marine diesel oil – there are alter-
native fuels becoming available, including LNG and Methanol.
However, to create extensive uptake of these fuels, infra-
structure for supply of the fuels is needed, along with a sig-
niﬁcant turnover of the world's ﬂeet to the machinery types
required. The timescale (out to 2025) is assumed not to be
sufﬁcient for a signiﬁcant adoption of an alternative fuel and so
a simplifying assumption to remove these alternative fuels from
the scenarios is considered appropriate.
In all instances, the design speed was held constant and the
operating speed of the ship was matched to the design speed. Whilst
it is recognised that this may not be reﬂective of all of the ﬂexibility
owners have in choosing the design speed of a ship and that operators
have in choosing voyage speeds, these were held constant to control
the scenario experiment. The results are therefore a comparison of,
ceteris paribus, levels of technology uptake as a function of some keyTable 2
Values for the investment parameters used in scenarios A– E.
Scenario Cost savings pass
through from operator to
owner/%
WACC for
owner/%
Return on investment
period for owner/years
A 100 10 3
B 100 10 20
C 100 2 20
D 50 10 3
E 25 10 3investment parameters. The investment parameters that were varied
and their speciﬁcations were as shown in Table 2.
There is no publicly available data listing the combination of
these investment parameters that best represents different owners
and operators in the shipping industry. The values chosen were
chosen so that they spanned some of the likely values (for example
the cost savings pass through cannot exceed 100% and is unlikely
to be less than 25%, the WACC can be guided by long-run interest
rates, and the return on investment is unlikely to be more than the
expected minimum economic life of a ship (20 years). Perhaps
scenario D could be suggested to be closest to reality for operators
of ocean going merchant shipping, but all the parameters are likely
to vary signiﬁcantly between ﬁrms and the speciﬁcs of the con-
tract(s) under which the ship is being operated. Therefore, these
should not be considered as deﬁnitive of the range of parameters
used in the sector, but illustrators of sensitivity.
3.4. Survey
A survey was used to assess the uptake of a number of cost-
effective and energy efﬁcient operational measures within the
shipping industry. The operational measures were selected from
Buhaug et al. (2009), Wang et al. (2010) and Lockley et al. (2011)
and are described in greater detail in Rehmatulla (2014). For the
ﬂow chart of the survey questions, question formats and survey
tools see Fig. 2 and for more details on the wording of the survey
questions refer to appendix A in Rehmatulla (2014). The unit of
analysis or target population were global shipping companies,
which were recruited from Clarksons Shipping Information Net-
work (SIN) database of shipowners. It is thought that this is the
most comprehensive list of the target population. However, upon
comparison with other online databases such as World Shipping
Directory slight under coverage of companies was noted. Every
effort was made to merge the frames to cover accurately the target
population.
Companies with more than ﬁve ships were selected, which con-
sisted of shipowners, shipowner-operators, ship management com-
pany and shipping division of major charterers or cargo owners in the
wetbulk, drybulk and container sectors only. A cut off of ﬁve ships was
required due to several reasons. There was a signiﬁcantly large tail of
small companies with less than ﬁve ships in their ﬂeet and a large
majority of these were single ship companies, which are created to
protect the beneﬁcial owner (Stopford, 2009). Cut off samples are
common in business surveys because smaller companies are generally
difﬁcult to reach (Eurostat, 2008). However, since one part of the
target population is deliberately excluded there is a chance to obtain
bias in the responses, for example one could be excluding small
shipowner-operators offering more energy efﬁcient services. Another
reason for the cut off in the sample was because the construction of
the sampling frame required merging the databases, ﬁltering com-
panies and entering the required ﬁelds, which was a resource inten-
sive task and therefore the cut off was an acceptable trade-off
between time and resources expended versus creating a more
reﬂective sampling frame containing over 5000 very small companies.
It should also be noted that the sampling frame constructed here is
more representative of the respondents compared to most of the
empirical studies on barriers to energy efﬁciency, which used non-
representative sampling frames, generally membership frames e.g.
Gordon (2008) and Hasanbeigi et al. (2009) resulting in higher non-
coverage errors and bias to a select group.
A stratiﬁed sampling approach was taken so as to represent the
different variables of interest to the survey. The majority of the
companies are headquartered in European Union region and the
Far East, altogether representing nearly 90% of the census popu-
lation as shown in Table 3. A company with 90% of its ﬂeet
belonging to a sector would be placed in the respective sector
Opening & introduction page
Q1: Selection of five measures with 
highest potential
Q2: Implementation of measures 
with highest potential
Q3: Barriers to measures not 
selected
Q4 – 8: Barriers and drivers to 
implementation of selected
Q9 – 10: Important factors during 
ship selection
Q11 – 12: Energy Efficiency Design 
Index as an information tool
Q13 – 14: Barriers to speed 
reduction
Q15 – 18: Respondent profiling 
questions
Q19 - 20: Company chartering ratio
Respondent and company details
Thank you and survey completion 
confirmation page
Display logic
Display logic
Skip logic & 
display logic
Skip logic & 
display logic
Skip logic & 
display logic
Survey tools Survey questions Question format
Multiple check box
Matrix/Grid
Matrix/Grid
Multiple check box
Multiple check box
Multiple check box
Multiple check box
Numerical input
Text input
Matrix/Grid
Fig. 2. Flow chart of survey questions, software tools and question formats used.
Table 3
Population divided according to major geographic regions, sector and size.
EU West Asia SC Far East Total
Wetbulk Large 9 6 2 10 27 (5%)
Medium 88 6 14 33 141 (24%)
Drybulk Large 4 3 1 10 18 (3%)
Medium 75 11 6 49 141 (24%)
Container Large 13 0 0 11 24 (4%)
Medium 37 4 2 14 57 (10%)
N. Rehmatulla, T. Smith / Ocean Engineering 110 (2015) 102–112108category and when the ﬂeet composition falls below 90% for one
sector, the company is placed under the mixed sector category. The
total number of companies that responded was 170, which con-
sisted of 120 almost complete (90% item response) responses and
50 partially completed responses. In order to be representative
and to make generalisations i.e. reach statistically overall sig-
niﬁcant results with a conﬁdence level of 90% and margin of error
interval of þ/15% or þ/20%, each stratum required a mini-
mum number of responses, presented in Rehmatulla (2012).Mixed Large 23 1 4 21 49 (8%)
Medium 80 1 8 54 143 (24%)
329 (55%) 32 (5%) 37 (6%) 202 (34%) 600 (100%)
4. Results & discussion
The results from the scenarios speciﬁed in Table 2 can be seen
inFig. 3. Only two examples are presented, corresponding to a large
tanker (VLCC) and a large containership. The results presented showthe model estimated forecast of the attained EEDI by newbuild designs
from 2010 to 2025. The trends are approximately similar for all ship
sizes, but because of variations in revenue, capital costs, operating costs
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Fig. 3. Results from scenario runs for newbuild EEDI in each year.
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Fig. 4. Implementation of operational measures believed to have highest potential.
1 – Efﬁcient voyage execution includes voyage planning and DWT utilisation.
– Speed reduction due to port efﬁciency includes Just In Time arrivals.
– Optimisation of ballast voyages includes ballast speed reduction.
2 Crosstabulations analysis only reveal the strength of the relationship
between the independent and dependant variables, direction and linearity of
relationships are not possible for nominal level data.
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type, the results are not exactly the same. In all cases, the upper limit of
the EEDI trajectories is represented by the EEDI regulation's required
EEDI value in each of the years (it progresses from 10% baseline
reduction in 2015 to 30% baseline reduction in 2025). The constraints
on design speed and machinery speciﬁcation mean that the only
source of energy efﬁciency improvement is technology. The range of
technology options available are not all compatible with each other and
the maximum feasible improvement of EEDI is 40%. This sets a lower
bound on the curves, which is reached in both instances in 2015 for the
most favourable investment parameter scenario
Scenario D (estimated to be Business As Usual, BAU) is shown to
follow the required EEDI values closely for both the ship types studied.
There is little discrepancy between E and D – perhaps more would be
seen if the constraint on achieving a maximum EEDI were relaxed.
Scenario A shows a signiﬁcant departure to D and E for the case of the
container ship, but the greatest discrepancy is shown when the return
on investment period is signiﬁcantly extended. There is little dis-
crepancy between scenarios B and C which differentiate from each
other solely on cost of capital. That discrepancy is more marked in the
instance of tankers, which is consistent with the general trend in the
results that imply that in A, B and C, a greater amount of dec-
arbonisation is achievable for the containership than the tanker given
the same set of investment parameters.
The results from the survey showed that fuel consumption mon-
itoring, general speed reduction and weather routing were cited as
measures that have the highest potential. The follow up question asked
whether they have considered or implemented the measure they
believed had the highest potential. Fig. 4 shows that even measures
that were cited as having the highest potential have actualimplementation rate of around 70%.1 On average across all the mea-
sures the implementation rate decreases to around 50%. This clearly
shows that despite the negative costs, ease of implementation (Acciaro
et al., 2013) and short payback period of most operational measures
(Wang et al., 2010), some measures still do not see 90–100% imple-
mentation. Many MACC studies assume that measures with negative
costs would have been fully implemented or will be implemented
under a certain fuel price. A discussion of the non-market failures and
market failures that could be contributing to this gap between the
potential and actual is discussed below.
4.1. Non-market failures
Some of the gap in the implementation could be explained by
rational behaviour of the ﬁrms. We apply the concept of heterogeneity
(a particular technology may be cost-effective on average, but not in all
cases) and see how size of the ﬁrm and the sector it operates in affects
the implementation of measures. Figs. 5 and 6 show that there is a
difference between the overall implementation rates for each of the
sizes and sectors. For some measures there is a positive relationship
between the size of the ﬁrm and the implementation and for some
measures a negative correlation can be observed. The relationship
between sector and implementation of a measure does not show clear
relationship in almost all cases.
Since the survey uses nominal level data, chi square based coefﬁ-
cients are used, which assess how the actual frequencies in the
crosstabulation differ from the expected frequency i.e. when there is no
association2 (Field, 2005). The raw chi square ﬁgure is converted into a
correlation index using the Cramer's V. The Cramer's V statistic is used
because one or both of the variables have more than two categories
(Field, 2005) e.g. size has three categories, small, medium and large and
implementation has two categories, implemented and not imple-
mented. To interpret the Cramer's V, Cohen's (1988) widely accepted
interpretation of effect sizes is used; 0.1 is a small effect size, 0.3 is
medium or moderate effect size and 0.5 is a large effect size. To make
inferences from the sample to the larger population and as a rule of
thumb for small samples it is suggested to use 0.05 as the critical point
(de Vaus, 1995). Table 4 shows the zero order (without controlling for
other variables) bivariate relationships or crosstabulations between
each measure's implementation and its association with sector and
N. Rehmatulla, T. Smith / Ocean Engineering 110 (2015) 102–112110size. In contrast to Figs. 5 and 6 the results show the sector in which a
ﬁrm operates has more of a relationship with the implementation of
the measures compared to the size of the ﬁrm. In general, however a
weak to moderate relationship between the two variables is observed
which cannot be generalised to the larger population. Similarly, mul-
tivariate regression analysis shows that neither of the variables (sector
and size) are good at explaining the implementation of the measures.
Hidden costs, access to capital and risk perception are cogent
reasons for why some shipping companies do not implement
measures and these can be easily misrepresented in techno-
economic modelling approaches, resulting in overestimation of
savings potential. The respondents were asked why they believed
the measures they had not selected initially had lower potential
for fuel savings. Lack of access to capital and additional costs
related to the measures fared very low in the responses to this
question (Rehmatulla, 2012), although, lack of access to capital and
additional costs had perfectly negative correlation with size of the
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Table 4
Results from the statistical testing of homogeneity in the survey respondents.
Measure Sector
Cramers V Signiﬁcance
Weather routing 0.305 0.151
General speed reduction 0.283 0.24
Fuel consumption monitoring 0.213 0.5364.2. Market failures
In general the most pertinent barrier across all measures that
were not selected i.e. seemed to have lower fuel-saving potential,
were; ‘lack of reliable information on cost and savings’, ‘difﬁcultly
in implementing under some types of charter’, ‘lack of direct
control over operations’ and ‘materiality of savings’, i.e. measures
may be ignored by decision-makers due to their limited impact
(Kollamthodi et al., 2008). These barriers represented on average
50% of barriers cited for any given measure. Analysing this in
greater detail, it can be seen that there were speciﬁc barriers for
each of the measures. Lack of reliable information on cost and
savings affects the potential for weather routing, autopilot
adjustment, trim/draft optimisation and raising crew awareness
and training. Weather routing and autopilot adjustment are
mature technologies (Wang et al., 2010) for which it would be
expected that such information is readily and reliably available. For
a breakdown of most cited barriers per measure refer to Rehma-
tulla and Smith (2015). There was not a clear relationship between
informational problems cited and size of the ﬁrm. For the survey,
indicators of split incentives were; the chartering ratio of the
company and the perception of the barrier. To assess the charter-
ing ratio respondents were asked about the percentage of the ﬂeet
that is owned, chartered in and out under the different types of
charter. The perception of the split incentive barrier was gauged
through three choice categories; ‘savings cannot be fully
recouped’, ‘difﬁcult to implement under some types of charter’ and
‘lack of direct control over operations’. For the chartering ratio, the
companies were divided into six groups to reﬂect company
structure and chartering ratio e.g. group 1 is a company that owns
majority (450%) of the ﬂeet and charters out majority (450%) of
the ﬂeet in spot market. Controlling for the sector, results in much
larger effect size but at the same time signiﬁcance values increase,
because of the smaller sample after controlling. As an example the
general speed reduction and chartering group correlation is 0.627
almost doubling after controlling for sector with p value of .215.
Table 5 shows the zero order relationships between implementa-
tion of measures and chartering group is relatively higher com-
pared to that of size and sector. This suggests that the split
incentives and thus market failures could have a higher inﬂuence
on the implementation of the energy efﬁciency measures, though
this cannot be generalised beyond the survey sample.Size Multivariate analysis
Cramers V Signiﬁcance R2 Signiﬁcance
0.117 0.557 0.1 0.3
0.178 0.266 0.11 0.25
0.189 0.208 0.08 0.45
Table 5
Results of correlation by group of different operational measures.
Measure Chartering Group Multivariate analysis
Cramer's V Signiﬁcance R2 Signiﬁcance
Weather routing .287 .394 .08 .42
General speed reduction .363 .154 .13 .15
Fuel consumption
monitoring
.284 .369 .08 .38
Raising crew awareness .485 .086 .23 .08
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This paper attempts to take a broad perspective on the subject
of the implementation barriers that could impede shipping's
transition to a lower carbon modus operandi. Given the extensive
evidence for an efﬁciency gap that is presented for other sectors of
the economy, it seems hard to imagine that a gap is not also
present in the shipping industry. Indeed the results of the survey
presented show implementation of around 70% for measures with
high fuel saving potential and an average implementation rate
across all the operational measures examined to be 50%, under the
assumption that most of the operational measures could be con-
sidered by classical analysis to be termed “cost-effective”. This
supports the hypothesis that an efﬁciency gap might exist for
shipping too.
In order to address the question: if an efﬁciency gap exists and
what might its signiﬁcance be, a study was undertaken using
GloTraM. This quantiﬁed the energy efﬁciency of newbuild ships
over the period 2010 to 2025 under a range of assumptions for the
investment parameters used as input parameters to the model.
The study showed that under certain investment circumstances, a
maximum impact on energy efﬁciency (in this instance a reduc-
tion of EEDI by approximately 40%) could be reached in 2015,
whereas with several of the range of scenarios considered, the
newbuild's energy efﬁciency would be ‘pegged’ to the level
deﬁned in the EEDI reduction trajectories.
Given the evidence for the existence of an efﬁciency gap, the
next challenge is to estimate which market barriers or failures
might be most likely to be responsible. Detailed analysis of the
survey data can provide some insight to this. The fact that a
greater implementation percentage is attributable to the measures
perceived to have the highest fuel saving implies either that agents
were behaving rationally or that there may be barriers that result
in the lack of uptake, i.e. it appears to refute the hypothesis that
there are modelling artefacts that exist that have not been taken
into account. The statistical analysis found that non-market fail-
ures were not obvious explanations for the patterns of uptake of
individual operational measures for the population studied.
However, extrapolating this conclusion to the whole ﬂeet could
not be fully justiﬁed due to the size of the sample. On the other
hand, market failures were found to be correlated to the imple-
mentation of individual measures, which supports the hypothesis
that they are a plausible explanation for the efﬁciency gap.
Further work is clearly beneﬁcial in a number of areas. GloTraM
could be used to consider the retroﬁt as well as the newbuild
sectors of the shipping industry. Results from such analysis could
then be combined in order to explore the impacts of different
levels of market barriers on the emissions of the sector and not
just the speciﬁcations of the ﬂeet. The survey that has been con-
ducted to understand the implementation scale and behaviours
around operational measures could be extended to include tech-
nical measures, smaller ﬁrms (with one to four ships in the ﬂeet)
and could also be increased in its sample size to improve statistical
control values. Further work could also delve further into more
granular details of the implementation of energy efﬁciency mea-
sures within a ﬁrm, for example investigating the drivers of
implementation and how the implementation permeates through
the entire ﬂeet of the company. Some attempt has been made
within the industry to assess the diffusion of operational and
technical measures, however these have been brief and subjective.
Further research could focus on a few key technologies’ ‘adoption’
at company level and ‘diffusion’ at the economy or industry level.Acknowledgements
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